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Abstract. As shown by Alvarez and Jermann (2003), the constrained eﬃcient
allocations of models with complete markets and limited commitment can be decentral-
ized with trade in a complete set of contingent claims subject to trading constraints
that are not too tight, in the sense that they allow for the maximum possible amount of
borrowing such that there is no default in equilibrium. On the other hand, the previous
decentralization is not possible in the presence of a capital accumulation. The reason is
that a shift in resources from one period to the next leads to a change in the aggregate
capital stock that aﬀects the autarky utility and drives a wedge between the expected
marginal rates of substitution and transformation in the standard capital Euler equation
of the planner’s problem. To take these eﬀects into account, one needs to include a sav-
ings constraint on the capital holdings, which is, however, diﬃcult to interpret. In the
present paper, we study the competitive equilibrium (CE) with a competitive interme-
diation sector that operates the investment technology and with no savings constraints.
We show that the CE allocations can be characterized with a similar system of equations
to the one characterizing the optimal allocations. The only diﬀerence is that the eﬀects
of capital accumulation on the autarky utilities is not internalized. In addition, our nu-
merical results show that these autarky eﬀects are quantitatively negligible. Thus, the
CE allocations in the absence of savings constraints are very similar to the constrained
eﬃcient solution, whereas our characterization considerably simpliﬁes the computation
of the equilibrium.
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11. Introduction
During the recent years, models with limited commitment have been introduced to study
several important economic issues. Among others, Thomas and Worrall (1988) study eﬃcient
wage contracts, Kocherlakota (1996) analyzes optimal risk sharing, Alvarez and Jermann
(2001) investigate asset prices and Krueger and Perri (2003) study inequality. Mostly, these
models have been studied in endowment economies, whereas limited commitment models
with capital accumulation have received less attention. In the present paper, we introduce
capital accumulation into a similar framework to the one studied by the previous authors and
study its consequences. In particular, we focus on the relationship between the constrained
eﬃcient allocations and the competitive equilibrium allocations with (endogenous) borrowing
limits and complete ﬁnancial markets.
As shown by Alvarez and Jermann (2000), the constrained eﬃcient allocations of models
with complete markets and enforcement constraints can be decentralized with debt con-
straints that are not too tight, in the sense that they are the loosest possible limits that
do not allow for default in equilibrium. We show that these decentralizations are not pos-
sible in a model with capital accumulation. The reason is that a shift in resources from
one period to the next in the presence of enforcement constraints has two additional eﬀects
on the standard Euler equation determining aggregate capital accumulation. On the one
hand, it increases the planner’s marginal rate of substitution, raising the beneﬁts of a higher
aggregate capital stock. On the other hand, a higher capital stock tightens the enforcement
constraints through an increase in the autarky value, reducing the beneﬁts of more capi-
tal. Since the previous eﬀects drive a wedge between the marginal rates of substitution and
transformation, one needs to impose a savings constraint on the individual capital holdings
to decentralize the model with debt constraints. Note that a similar result has been obtained
by Kehoe and Perri (2002,2005) in a related multi-country model, where the diﬀerent agents
are interpreted as representative agents of diﬀerent countries. Further, they also show that
one can decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations in their environment with partial
governmental default on loans to foreign households and capital income taxes.
In the present paper, we focus instead on a decentralization with borrowing constraints
for two reasons. First, since we assume that there is only one production sector, our agents
cannot be interpreted as countries but rather as two diﬀerent households that engage in
a trading contract to smooth consumption over time. Consequently, governmental default
would not make sense in this environment. Second, a decentralization with debt constraints
leads to lower interest rates with respect to a decentralization with sovereign default, being
therefore more promising to explain (closed economy) asset pricing moments.
First, a key extension of the present work to the existing decentralization literature is
the introduction of ﬁnancial intermediaries that operate the investment technology and set
the trading limits. In contrast to the ﬁndings of Kehoe and Perri (2002,2005), we show that
a decentralization of the constrained eﬃcient allocations with borrowing constraints in the
presence of ﬁnancial intermediaries is not possible only due to the impact on capital on the
autarky valuations. As shown by the previous authors, however, these eﬀects can be taken
into account if one imposes a savings constraint on the capital holdings of the intermediary.
Second, since there is little evidence of the presence of savings constraints in the data,
while it is diﬃcult to provide equilibrium micro-foundations for them, we also characterize
the decentralized equilibrium allocations with no savings constraints and borrowing limits
that are not too tight. In particular, we show that the equilibrium allocations solve almost
2t h es a m es y s t e mo fe q u a t i o n sa st h ec o n s t r a i n e de ﬃcient allocations, with the key diﬀerence
that the aforementioned eﬀects of aggregate capital accumulation on the autarky values are
not internalized. In addition, we also show how the borrowing limits that are not too tight
can arise as an equilibrium outcome when the intermediaries are free to choose them.
Note that this characterization results provides a relatively simple solution method, which
is similar to the one used to solve constrained eﬃcient allocations, for a potentially very com-
plicated equilibrium problem. Further, our numerical results show that, in the long-run, the
competitive equilibrium allocations with and without saving limits exhibit permanent risk
sharing. The key diﬀerence between the two economies arises in the short run from the fact
that the economy will over accumulate capital in the absence of the savings constraint, which
in turns implies a lower range of possible wealth distributions in the short run. In addition,
our numerical results suggest that the autarky eﬀects are quantitatively unimportant, im-
plying that the equilibrium allocations without saving constraints are very similar to the
constrained eﬃcient solution.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model economy.
Section three discusses the benchmark competitive equilibrium with borrowing constraints
that are not too tight. Section 4 introduces the constrained eﬃcient allocations and Sec-
tion 5 shows how one can decentralize these with a competitive equilibrium with borrowing
constraints and a capital accumulation constraints on the ﬁnancial intermediaries. The com-
petitive equilibrium in the absence of the capital accumulation constraint is characterized
in Section 6, where we also provide micro foundations for the borrowing limits. Finally,
Section 7 compares the two competitive equilibria quantitatively and Section 8 summarizes
and concludes.
2. The Economy
We consider an inﬁnite horizon economy with aggregate technology shocks and idiosyncratic
labor income shocks. Time is discrete and indexed by t =0 ,1,2.... Further, the resolution of
uncertainty is represented by an information structure or event-tree N, where each node or
date-state st ∈ N, summarizing the history of the environment through and including date
t,h a saﬁnite number of immediate successors, denoted by st+1|st.W eu s et h en o t a t i o nsr|st
with r ≥ t to indicate that node sr belongs to the sub-tree with root st. In addition, with
the exception of the unique root node s0 at date t =0 , each node has a unique predecessor,
denoted by st−1. The probability as of period 0 of date-event st is denoted by π(st),w i t h
π(s0)=1 , since the initial realization s0 is given. In addition, we denote by π(sr|st) the





st∈N throughout the section.
At each node st, there exists a spot market for a single consumption good y(st) ∈ R+,
produced with the following aggregate technology:
y(st)=f(z(st),K(st−1),L(st)) (1)




∈ R++ given. Further, z(st) ∈ R++ is an aggregate productivity shock that
follows a stationary Markov chain with Nz possible values.
We assume that the production function f(z,·,·):R2
+ → R+ is continuously diﬀerentiable
on the interior of its domain, strictly increasing, strictly concave in K and L separately, and
homogeneous of degree one in the two arguments. We also assume that fK(z,K,L) > 0
and fL(z,K,L) > 0 for all K>0 and L>0,a n dt h a tlimK→0 fK(z,K,1) = ∞ and
3limk→∞ fK(z,K,1) = 0. To simplify notation, the total output including undepreciated




+( 1− δ)K(st−1) (2)
where δ is the capital depreciation rate.
The economy is populated by two types of households indexed by i =1 ,2, each containing
a continuum of identical inﬁnitely lived consumers1. Households have additively separable
















where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor and E0 denotes the expectation conditional
on information at date t =0 . We assume that the period utility function u is strictly
increasing, strictly concave and continuously diﬀerentiable, with limci→0 u0(ci)=∞,a n d
limci→∞ u0(ci)=0 .
At each date-state st, households receive a stochastic labour endowment  i(st),f o l l o w i n g
a stationary Markov chain with N  possible values. We assume that households supply labor
inelastically, and we therefore have that L(st)=
P
i∈I  i(st). Further, they have a potentially
history dependent outside option Vi
¡
st¢
, implying that they are subject to a participation





βr−tπ(sr)u(ci (sr)) ≥ Vi(st) for i =1 ,2.( 4 )






+( 1− δ)K(st−1). (5)
3. Competitive Equilibrium with Borrowing Constraints
This section deﬁnes a competitive equilibrium of the above economy where agents can trade
in one period ahead Arrow securities subject to borrowing constraints. We assume that the
economy is populated by a representative ﬁrm that operates the production technology and
by a competitive ﬁnancial intermediation sector operating the investment technology. The
intermediaries are risk neutral, and we use the representative intermediary in what follows,
since we want to focus on symmetric equilibria.
Each period, after observing the realization of the productivity shock, the representative






The proﬁt maximization implies that the wages and capital rental rate are given by the
following expressions at every node:
w(st)=fL(st) ≡ fL(z(st),K(st−1),L(st)) (6)
1All the results in the paper hold for a ﬁnite number I of agents, and the assumption that I =2is therefore
without loss of generality. On the other hand, it simpliﬁes both the notation and the computations.
4r(st)=fK(st) ≡ fK(z(st),K(st−1),L(st)). (7)
The representative intermediary lives for two periods. An intermediary born at node
st ﬁrst decides how much capital k(st) to purchase at period t. The capital is rented to
the ﬁrm, earning a rental revenue of r(st+1)k(st) and a liquidation value of (1 − δ)k(st) the
following period. Further, to ﬁnance the capital purchases, the intermediary sells the future
consumption goods in the spot market for one period ahead contingent claims traded at price
q(st+1|st), which represents the price of one unit of consumption good delivered at t +1 ,
















q(st+1|st)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)]. (8)
At each note st, households can trade through the ﬁnancial intermediaries in a complete
set of state contingent claims to one period ahead consumption. If we denote by ai(st+1)
the amount of contingent claims chosen by household i ∈ I at the end of period t,t h e













q(st+1|st)ai(st+1) ≤ w(st) i(st)+ai(st) (9)
ai(st+1) ≥ Ai(st+1) for ∀st+1|st (10)




i=1,2 of Arrow securities are given. Note that, for the state
contingent debt issued by the intermediary to match the demand from the households, it must
b et h ec a s et h a t
P
i ai(st+1)=[ r(st+1)+(1−δ)]k(st). Further, the Arrow security holdings
are subject to the borrowing constraints Ai(st+1), which are set by the intermediaries so that
no intermediary has an incentive to deviate. The determination of these limits is discussed
below.
If γce
i (st+1) ≥ 0 is the multiplier on the portfolio constraint (10) of security ai(st+1),t h e






















[ai(st) − Ai(st)] ≤ 0. (12)
5Clearly, the portfolio constraint can only be binding for one of the two households, im-
plying that γce
i (st+1)=0for at least one household. The ﬁrst order condition in (11) can

















i ai(s0)=[ r(s0)+( 1− δ)]K(s−1) is a vector
of quantities {ci,k,a i,K} and prices {w,r,q} such that (i) given prices {ci,a i} solves the
problem for each household; (ii) the factor prices {w,r} satisfy the optimality conditions
of the ﬁrm; (iii) q and r satisfy the optimality condition of the intermediary; (iv) all mar-
kets clear, i.e. k(st)=K(st),
P
i ai(st+1)=[ r(st+1)+1− δ]K(st),
P





As stated earlier, we assume that each household has an outside option. In particular, we
assume that households can leave the risk sharing arrangement at any date-state and go to
ﬁnancial autarky. In this case, they will only be able to consumer their labour income, and
they are excluded from ﬁnancial markets forever2. Similarly to Alvarez and Jermann (1997),
we choose limits that are not too tight, in the sense that any further loosening will imply
that agents with that level of debt prefer to go to ﬁnancial autarky. In order to determine
these limits, we can write (Problem 1) recursively as follows:







s.t. (9) and (10),
K(st)=Γ(Si(st+1)) (Problem 1’)
where Si(st+1) is deﬁned as before and Γ is the law of motion of the aggregate capital, which
is taken as given by the households.
Deﬁnition 2 The borrowing constraints on Arrow securities are not too tight if they
satisfy the following condition for all i =1 ,2 and all nodes st ∈ N:
Wce(Ai(st),S i(st)) = V ce(Si(st)) (14)










Note that, since the value of staying in the trading contract Wce is increasing in wealth,






implies that, for all







u(ci (sr)) ≥ V ce(Si(st)).
2In section (7), we also consider a case where households are excluded from the complete market scenario
described here, but where they can save by accumulating physical capital.
64. Constrained Efficient Allocations
This section characterizes the constrained eﬃcient allocations of the previous economy. This
allocation solves a central planning problem where the planner takes into account both the
resource constraint and the participation constraints of the two households. If αi is the initial






















βr−tπ(sr)u(ci(sr)) ≥ V (Si
¡
st¢
) for i =1 ,2. (17)
As in the previous section, we have assumed that the value of the outside option for type



















The previous equations reﬂect that standard dynamic programming is inapplicable, since
future decision variables appear in the participation constraints. However, following Marcet



















In the previous equation, βtγi(st) denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the time t partici-
pation constraint for household i ∈ I,w h i l eµi(st) ≡
Pt
r=0 γi(sr), where the summation is
over the particular history st. Further, this pseudo state variable can be deﬁned recursively
by:
µi(st)=µi(st−1)+γi(st), µi(s−1)=0for i =1 ,2. (18)
It is easy to see that the solution to the previous problem can be characterized by the re-









































for i =1 ,2.
3The ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are only necessary but not suﬃcient in general. The reason
is that the constraint set deﬁned by (16) and (17) is not necessarily convex. More precisely, convexity is
guaranteed only if V is convex in capital. Unfortunately, V is a concave function in our application. So,
we assume for now that the ﬁrst-order conditions are suﬃcient and we will see later that this assumption is
satisﬁed for the examples we consider.






) for i =1 ,2 on the
right hand side represent the derivatives of total output F and of the outside option value
V with respect to the aggregate capital stock K. Further, we have expressed the equations
in terms of the normalized multipliers λ and vi, which simplify the system of equilibrium












Here, it is important to note that vi(st) > 0 only if γi(st) > 0 due to the fact that
µi(st−1)+αi > 0.T h i si m p l i e st h a tvi(st) is positive only when the participation constraint
of type i ∈ I is binding. Note also that λi st h e“ t e m p o r a r y ”r e l a t i v eP a r e t ow e i g h to ft y p e2
households relative to type 1 households. Thus, as usual in models with complete markets,
condition (19) says that the relative consumptions of the two types are determined by their
(temporary) relative Pareto weights. Further, as in other models with commitment (see for
example Thomas and Worrall [1988] and Kocherlakota [1996]) whenever households belong-
ing to type 1 have a binding participation constraint (v1(st) > 0), λ is decreasing, and their
relative Pareto weight is increasing. The opposite happens when the participation constraint
of type 2 household is binding. Finally, notice that, whenever the aggregate technology
and the idiosyncratic labor endowment shock are Markovian, the optimal allocation of this
problem is recursive in ( 1,  2,K,λ).
As reﬂected by the Euler equation in (20), when the participation constraints are not
binding for any household at any continuation history st+1,i m p l y i n gt h a tvi(st+1)=0for all
st+1|st and for i =1 ,2, the equation reduces to the standard capital Euler condition of the
stochastic growth model. On the other hand, the presence of binding enforcement constraints
at a any continuation state st+1 introduces two additional eﬀects on the intertemporal alloca-
tion of consumption and capital. First, it increases the planner’s marginal rate of substitution
between period t and t +1goods, raising the beneﬁts of a higher aggregate capital stock at
t +1 . This is due to the fact that a higher future capital increases output and consequently




the ﬁrst part of the right hand side of the equation. Second, a higher capital stock at t +1
tightens the enforcement constraints through an increase in the autarky value, reducing the
beneﬁts of a higher capital at t +1 . T h i si sr e ﬂected by the autarky eﬀects on the second
part of the right hand side of the equation.
As shown by Alvarez and Jermann (1997) and Kehoe and Perri (2002,2004), who study
the constrained eﬃcient allocations of economies with complete markets and participation




































u0(c2(st−1)) if vi(st)=0for i =1 ,2. Further, if
v2(st) > 0 and v1
¡
st¢
=0 , implying that the participation constraint is binding for agent




u0(c2(st−1)), and the opposite holds if v2(st)=0and v1(st) > 0.












for all st+1|st. Thus, we can use the adjusted intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of

































In what follows, we focus on allocations that have high implied interest rates, in the
sense that they have a ﬁnite present value when discounted with the appropriate present
value prices. Following Alvarez and Jermann (1997), we say that an allocation x has high


















In the next section, we show that set-up in Section 3 needs to be modiﬁed in order to
decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocation as a competitive equilibrium with trading
constraints that are not too tight. Further, the competitive equilibrium described in the
previous section is further characterized in section 6.
5. Decentralization with Sequential Trade
In this section, we ﬁrst show that constrained eﬃcient allocations with an outside option
of ﬁnancial autarky cannot be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with trade in one
period ahead Arrow securities subject to borrowing constraints that are not too tight. We
then argue that this decentralization is possible if one introduces a savings constraint on the
capital holdings of the intermediary.
As to the ﬁrst ﬁnding, a similar result has been shown by Kehoe and Perri (2002,2004),
who study an economy with no ﬁnancial intermediaries and with two production sectors that
can be interpreted as countries. In their environment, the impossibility of a decentralization
in the presence of participation constraints is due to the two eﬀects on the standard Euler
equation discussed above. In contrast to this, we show that this impossibility is solely due
to the autarky eﬀects in the presence of ﬁnancial intermediaries.
9In addition, the previous authors show that a decentralization is possible if one introduces
either a savings constraints on the capital holdings of the households or government default
on foreign debt and capital income taxes. In our framework, however, government default is
not a viable option, since it requires that agents of a given type are able to coordinate. In
addition, it is diﬃcult to imagine that governments would default on behalf of some of the
households against some other households in the same economy. Given this, we focus on a
decentralization with borrowing constraints. Further, we show that this decentralization is
also possible in our framework if one imposes a savings or accumulation constraint on the
capital holdings of the intermediary.
Our ﬁrst result is stated by the following proposition, which is analogous to proposition
5 in Kehoe and Perri (2002).






has high implied interest rates. Then, it cannot be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium
with trade in one period ahead Arrow securities subject to borrowing constraints on the Arrow
security holdings that are not too tight.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :To prove the proposition, recall that the capital Euler equation



































On the other hand, the equilibrium condition of the intermediary in the competitive


















where we have substituted for q(st+1|st) and r
¡
st+1¢
from (13) and (7). Clearly, the previ-
ous two equations cannot be satisﬁe db yt h es a m ea l l o c a t i o n{c1,c 2,K} if the participation
constraint is ever binding, that is, if vj(st+1) > 0 for some st+1 with π(st+1) > 0. It therefore
follows that constrained eﬃcient allocations cannot be decentralized as a competitive equi-
librium with borrowing constraints on the Arrow security holdings that are not too tight.¥
Several remarks are worth noting. First, the previous result is in contrast to the one
obtained by Alvarez and Jermann (1997), who show that a decentralization of the con-
strained eﬃcient allocations with borrowing constraints that are not too tight is possible
in the absence of capital accumulation. Second, the equations reﬂect that the impossibility
of a decentralization in the presence of ﬁnancial intermediaries is solely due to the autarky
eﬀects on the planner’s Euler equation, an observation that will prove to be useful in the
next section. To see this, note that, if no intermediaries were present, the budget constraint





























+1− δ] for i =1 ,2.
Comparing the previous equation to the Euler equation of the planner, it is easy to
s e et h a tb o t hc a n n o tb es a t i s ﬁed by the same allocation, even if the value of autarky is
independent of capital and VK(Sj
¡
st¢
) ≡ 0 for all st+1 and j =1 ,2.K e h o e a n d P e r r i
(2002,2004) suggests that imposing a savings constraint on the individual capital holdings
takes care of both Euler equation eﬀects. In what follows, we show that a similar result can
also be obtained in our setup. In particular, we show that the constrained eﬃcient allocations
can be decentralized with borrowing constraints on the total asset wealth if one imposes a
savings constraint on the capital holdings of the intermediary. This is stated by the following
proposition.






has high implied interest rates. Further, assume that the intermediary in the decentralized
economy is subject to a savings constraint of the form k(st) ≤ B(st). Then, the constrained
eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with borrowing con-
straints on the total asset wealth that are not too tight.
Before proving the proposition, we start by describing the economy in the presence of a
savings constraint on the capital holdings of the intermediary. In particular, if we let ψ(st)














[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)] − ψ(st.) (26)
Since ψ(st) ≥ 0, the previous equation implies that 1 ≤
P
st+1|st q(st+1|st)[r(st+1)+(1−







q(st+1|st)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)]k(st) − k(st)=ψ(st)k(st). (27)
As before, the intermediaries operate for two periods. Further, we assume that the
proﬁts they make are distributed to the households when they are realized, i.e. during
the ﬁrst period of the intermediary’s life-cycle. The period before an intermediary starts








denote the share representing a claim to the next period proﬁts held by household


























































Finally, we assume that the total asset wealth of the household at the end of period t is








where Wce(Ai(st+1),S i(st+1)) = V ce(Si(st+1)), and the two value functions are deﬁned as
above. A competitive equilibrium can then be deﬁned as in the previous section, noting





































[ωi(st) − Ai(st)] ≤ 0. (31)
It is easy to see that constrained eﬃcient allocations assuming that the outside option
involves consuming the labor income can now be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium.
The proof is presented in what follows, and it extends the ones in Alvarez and Jermann
(1997) and Kehoe and Perri (2002) to the presence of ﬁnancial intermediaries that operate
the investment technology and are subject to a savings constraint.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :We ﬁrst note that the savings constraint B(st) can be set so
that a constrained eﬃc i e n ta l l o c a t i o nt h a ts a t i s ﬁes the planner’s capital Euler equation in
(23) also satisﬁes the optimality condition of the intermediary in (26). In particular, when
the enforcement constraint in the planner’s problem does not bind for any household at
period t+1,i m p l y i n gt h a tvi
¡
st+1¢
=0for i =1 ,2 and all st+1, B(st) is set to an arbitrary
large number. Further, when the enforcement constraint in the planner’s problem is binding
for any of the two households, B(st) is set to the level of capital that solves the optimal




















where ψ(st) ≥ 0 due to the fact that vi(st+1) ≥ 0, u0 ¡
ci(st)
¢
≥ 0 and VK(Si
¡
st+1¢
) ≥ 0 for
i =1 ,2. Further, the last inequality follows from the fact that the marginal product of labor
is increasing in capital5.
Given the capital allocation from the planner’s problem, we can construct the wage












that satisfy the optimality
conditions of the ﬁrm in the competitive equilibrium at each node. Further, given the
4This is possible due to the fact that limB(st)→0 ψ(s
t)=+ ∞ and limB(st)→∞ ψ(s
t)=0 .
5It is important to note that, with all production functions in the CES family, wages are concave in capital
and V is therefore a concave function of capital as well.
12consumption allocations from the planner’s problem, we can use (24) and (25) to deﬁne
the prices q(st+1|st)=qp(st+1|st) and Q(st+1|st)=Qp(st+1|st). In addition, q(st+1|st) can
be used to deﬁne the multiplier γce
i (st+1) so that the asset Euler condition of the agents is
satisﬁed. Note that it will have the desired properties. In particular, if vi =0 , γce
i (st+1)=0 .
Further, if vi(st+1) > 0, it follows that γce
i (st+1) > 0. To see this, suppose that vj(st+1) > 0


































Since the high implied interest rate condition holds, we can then use the budget constraint
of the households in the competitive equilibrium to construct the wealth levels ωi(st) that
support the constrained eﬃcient consumption allocations at every node. To do this, we ﬁrst
construct the proﬁts d
¡
st¢
from (27), the share price p
¡
st¢
from (28), and the individual









. Further, we iterate on the budget constraint of

























































The initial asset holding ai
¡
s0¢






























and we will redeﬁne the limit for these cases later. In addition, if vi(st) > 0,w es e tAi(st+1)=
ωi(st+1), implying that it will be binding when the participation constraint in the planner’s






































































The ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that [ωi(st) − Ai(st)] is equal to zero if the









st+n|st Q(st+n|st)ci(st+n). The second follows from the fact
that ci(st) ≤
P
i ci(st). The third inequality follows from the the deﬁnition of Q(st|s0) and
from the fact that Q(st|s0) ≥ βtπ(st)
u0(ci(st))
u0(ci(s0)) by construction. Finally, the last equality
follows form the high implied interest rate condition.


























































































It only remains to redeﬁne the borrowing limits so that they are not too tight. To do






βr−tπ(sr)u(fL (sr) i (sr)).
We can then use (Problem 1’) to generate the value function Wce(ωi(st),S i(st)) and we
use these two functions to redeﬁne the borrowing constraints for the nodes where the limit
is not binding. In particular, we can iterate on the constraint Ai(st) until we ﬁnd the one
14that satisﬁes Wce(Ai(st),S i(st)) = V ce(Si(st)). Since the new set of constraints constraint
is (weakly) tighter than before, the new value of ωi − Ai still satisﬁes the transversality
condition. Further, since, these constraints do not bind for any household for whom the
participation constraint is not binding in the planner’s solution, the allocation derived above
with the original constraints is still feasible and optimal.¥
6. Characterization of the CE without Savings Constraints
The previous section shows that a decentralization of the constrained eﬃcient allocations
with sequential trade and borrowing constraints is possible in the presence of ﬁnancial in-
termediaries that are subject to a savings constraint on the capital holdings. These type of
constraints, however, are diﬃcult to interpret and are not typically found in the data. In
particular, it is diﬃcult to imagine how these upper bounds would arise as an equilibrium
outcome. On the other hand, Proposition 5 at the end of this section Proposition shows
that, if the intermediaries can set the borrowing limits on households, they will choose the
ones which are not to tight. Given this, the present section characterizes the competitive
equilibrium allocations with no savings constraints. In particular, it is shown that it satisﬁes
the same system of equations as the constrained eﬃcient problem except the Euler condition

















This result is stated by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let {c1,c 2,K} be a solution to equations (16), (17), (19), (21), (22)
and (34) where c =
P
i ci has high implied interest rates. Then, this allocation can be
decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with trade in one period ahead Arrow securities
subject to borrowing constraints on the Arrow security holdings that are not too tight.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : The proof follows the same arguments as the proof of propo-
sition 2, and we therefore only sketch it in what follows. First, given the consumption allo-
cations {ci}i=1,2 from the planner’s problem, we can use (24) and (25) to deﬁne the prices
q(st+1|st)=qp(st+1|st) and Q(st+1|st)=Qp(st+1|st) for all nodes. Further, since the high
implied interest rate condition holds, we can then use the prices and the budget constraint of
the households to construct the holdings {ai}i=1,2 so that the constrained eﬃcient consump-
tion allocations {ci}i=1,2 are feasible at every node. Note that, in the absence of a savings
constraint, the proﬁts of the intermediary are always equal to zero. Concerning the trading





and we will redeﬁne this limit later. Further, if vi(st) > 0,w es e tAi(st+1)=ai(st+1),
implying that it will be binding when the participation constraint in the planner’s problem
is binding. To make sure that the suﬃcient Euler equations are satisﬁed, we can ﬁrst use
q(st+1|st) to deﬁne the multiplier γce
i (st+1) so that the Euler condition of the agents in (11)
is satisﬁed. It is easy to see that an allocation that satisﬁes (34) also satisﬁes the equilibrium
condition of the intermediary in (8). Further, using the same arguments as in the proof of
proposition 2, we can check that the transversality condition in (12) is satisﬁed. Finally, we
can construct the value functions W(ai(st);Si(st)) and V (Si(st)) from the value functions
of the planner’s problem and redeﬁne the borrowing constraints on Arrow security holdings
15so that they satisfy W(Ai(st+1);Si(st+1)) = V (Si(st+1)) at every node. Since these limits
do not bind for the originally unconstrained consumers, the allocations obtained under the
natural borrowing limits are still feasible and optimal.¥
The following proposition shows that the reverse is also true.
Proposition 4 Let {c1,c 2,K,q,r,w} be a competitive equilibrium with borrowing con-
straints {Ai} that are not too tight. Then {c1,c 2,K} is a solution to equations (16), (17),





i ci(st) satisﬁes the high implied interest rates
condition with respect to the price Q(st|s0) deﬁned by:
Q(st|s0)=q(st|st−1)q(st−1|st−2)...q(s1|s0).
Proof of Proposition 4: To prove the proposition, we ﬁrst note that the resource con-
straint in (16) is satisﬁed by the equilibrium allocations. Since the asset holdings are subject
to portfolio restrictions {Ai} that are not too tight, the value functions in the competitive
equilibrium satisfy:
Wce(ai(st),S i(st)) ≥ V ce(Si(st))













It therefore follows that the functions deﬁned by W(Si(st)) = Wce(ai(st),S i(st)) and
V (Si(st)) = V ce(Si(st)) satisfy the participation constraints in (17). We also note that the
competitive equilibrium allocations still solve the same problem if the borrowing constraints
on the Arrow securities of the unconstrained households are substituted for the natural










Optimality implies that the previous limit is ﬁnite6. In addition, since the shocks z and
 i lie in a compact set, the present values of K and fL
¡
st¢
are ﬁnite. Using the resource
constraint, it is then easy to see that the competitive equilibrium allocation satisﬁes the high
implied interest rate condition.
To recover the multipliers in the planner’s problem, we can ﬁrst use the equilibrium
consumption allocations to deﬁne λ(st)=
u0(c1(st))
u0(c2(st)) .F u r t h e r ,{vi}i=1,2 can be recovered as
6In an exchange economy context with sequential trade and potentially incomplete ﬁnancial markets,
Santos and Woodford (1997) show that the natural borrowing limit implied by the optimal allocations has to
be ﬁnite. Otherwise, one can construct a portfolio that yields more utility than the optimal allocation. The
same proof can be used in the present setup.
16follows. If the portfolio constraint is not binding for household i at node st in the decentral-
ized problem, we set vi(st)=0 . Otherwise, if it is binding for agent two, we set v1(st)=0












































































the modiﬁed Euler equations (34) is also satisﬁed.¥
Several remarks are worth noting. First, whereas the competitive equilibrium without
savings constraints solves a system of equations that is very similar to the optimal plan-
ner’s problem, considerably simplifying the equilibrium computations, the solution is still
suboptimal due to the fact that it ignores the autarky eﬀects. The key here that ﬁnancial
intermediaries do not internalize the eﬀect of capital accumulation on default incentives,
whereas the planner internalizes this eﬀect in the (constrained) optimal allocation. Further,
the next section shows that these autarky eﬀects are quantitatively unimportant. Thus,
there is little diﬀerence between the optimal allocations of the CE model without savings
constraints.
Second, λ(st) measures the relative wealth of the two types of households. To see this,










where the second inequality is a consequence of Proposition 4. The above identity implies
that λ(st) measures the relative wealth of type 2 versus type 1, since the bigger is ai(st) the
smaller is ξi(st), which measures the marginal utility of wealth. Therefore a higher λ(st)
implies that agent 1 has a smaller initial wealth compared to type 2 households.
Third, our equilibrium concept and the characterization provided above does not neces-
sarily require that the limits are not too tight. In particular, the participation constraints
17will be satisﬁed for any limits that are equal or tighter to the limits deﬁn e db y( 1 4 ) . I n
what follows we provide some micro foundations for these limits by letting the intermedi-
aries set them. We ﬁrst show that no intermediary has incentives to loosen or tighten the
limits individually when they are set to be not too tight. This implies that this choice of
the constraints is indeed an equilibrium decision of the intermediaries. We also show that no
symmetric equilibrium exists where some or all of the limits are looser than the ones dictated
by (14).
Proposition 5 (i) The CE with borrowing constraints that are not too tight remains to be
a competitive equilibrium if intermediaries can set the borrowing limits. (ii) No symmetric
competitive equilibrium exists for limits that are looser than the ones that are no too tight.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :( i )We now show that there are no proﬁtable deviations from
the equilibrium allocation with limits that are looser then the ones deﬁned by (14). To see
this, ﬁrst notice that tightening the limits will not increase the proﬁts of any intermediary.
In what follows we show that no intermediary can make positive proﬁts by making loosening
the limits, that is, by setting Ai(st) ≤ Ai(st) < 0 for all st and assume (without a loss of
generality) that A1(b s) <A 1(b s) for some b s|e s where the participation constraint was binding
for agent at wealth level A1(b s). This implies that under the original prices q(st+1|e s), type 1
agents would default if next period node b s|e s occurs. Since type 1 households would choose
a1(b s) <A i(b s) < 0 and default if b s occurs, it is easy to see that the intermediary would make
negative proﬁts. First deﬁne a1(st+1|e s) as the asset decision of type 1 households under
the new limits and observe that a1(b s) <A i(b s) < 0 under q(b s|e s). Then default of type 1








q(st+1|e s)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)]k(e s)=0 .
For the second equality we used the intermediaries equilibrium condition (8).
(ii) Now we show that there does not exist any symmetric equilibrium with limits that
are looser than the limits that are not too tight. To do this, we assume that the limits
are such that some agent would default in equilibrium. In particular, we assume that there
exists an equilibrium with prices q and limits {Ai}i=1,2 such that agents of type 1 would
default under some continuation history st+1|st = b s|st if the current history is st = e s.F i r s t ,
notice that perfect competition would still require that intermediaries will make zero proﬁts.




q(st+1|e s)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)]k(e s)+q(b s|e s)a1(b s)=0 .





q(st+1|e s)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)]k(e s) > 0.
Thus, in any symmetric equilibrium with default, it must be the case that:
X
st+1|e s
q(st+1|e s)[r(st+1)+( 1− δ)] − 1 > 0.
18The previous condition implies that any intermediary could make arbitrarily positive
proﬁts by trading only with agents of type 2 and by demanding arbitrary large amounts of
total deposits (
P
st+1|e s q(st+1|e s)a2(e s)) from them. However, this contradicts the fact that
the original portfolio was optimal for the intermediaries under q(st+1|st).¥
7. Quantitative Comparison of the Competitive Equilibria
In this section we solve numerically for both competitive equilibrium allocations (with and
without savings constraints). The parameters of the economy are calibrated following the
asset pricing and real business cycle literature. The time period is assumed to be one quarter,
and the discount factor and depreciation rate are therefore set to β =0 .99 and δ =0 .025.
Concerning the functional forms, we assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas,
with a constant capital share of α =0 .36. Further, the utility function of the households
is assumed to be u(c)=l o g ( c). Finally, the exogenous shock processes are assumed to be
independent. In particular, the aggregate technology shock follows a two state Markov chain












We assume that aggregate labor supply is constant and we normalize it to 1. As to the
idiosyncratic income process, it is assumed to follow a seven state Markov chain. Further, the
values and transition matrix are obtained by using the Hussey and Tauchen (1991) procedure
to discretize the following process:
 i0 =( 1− ψ )µ  + ψ  i + u, u ∼ N(0,σ2
u).
where the shock parameters are set to ψ  =0 .956 and σ2
u =0 .082, corresponding to quarterly
adjusted estimates from annual data used by Aiyagari (1994). Constant aggregate labor
supply implies that  −i =1−  i, and the values for  1 were chosen to be symmetric around
µ  =0 .5. Consequently, the idiosyncratic productivity of the two types follows the same
process and the shocks are perfectly negatively correlated across the two types.
Note that Proposition 3 and 4 provide us with a relatively easy and analogous solution
method for both models. In the competitive equilibrium with saving constraint (autarky
eﬀects) we use equations (16), (17), (19), (21), (22) and (20). Further, to solve for the
competitive equilibrium with no savings constraints (no autarky eﬀects), we use the same
system of equations but (20) is replaced by (34).
In what follows, we let s1 =[  ,λ;z,K] and s2 =[ 1−  ,1/λ;z,K]. Under our Markovian
assumption on the shocks, the previous set of equations implies that we can describe the
optimal allocations in both models by the consumption functions {ci(si)}i=1,2 , the normal-
ized multipliers on the participations constraints {νi(si)}i=1,2 and the laws of motion for the
relative wealth λ0(s1) and aggregate capital K0(s1). To solve for these functions, we have
used policy functions iterations in both models
Our numerical results are presented on Figures 1 to 4 in the Appendix. All the optimal
policies are conditioned on the low aggregate technology shock z =0 .99 and on K =3 8 .6,
which is in the stationary distribution of capital. For expositional convenience, we have
plotted the results for only three levels of the labour endowment, where  1 is the lowest and
 7 is the highest labor endowment. Recall that type 2 households have the highest labor
19endowment when type 1 households have the lowest. Note also that both types have equal
endowments when  4 =1−  4 =0 .5.
Figure 1 displays λ0 ≡ λ(st+1) as a function of λ(st) for the three diﬀerent levels of the
idiosyncratic income shocks. The ﬁrst thing that is reﬂected by the ﬁgure is that agents
enjoy permanent perfect risk sharing in the long run in both models. To see this, assume
ﬁr s tt h a to u ri n i t i a lλ is inside its ergodic set, which is equal to λ ∈ [0.8368,1.195] and λ ∈
[0.8366,1.1953] for the models without and with the savings constraint respectively. As we see
on the graph, λ0 = λ inside this region, independently of the labor income shocks. Condition
(19) implies then that this can only happen if neither agent’s participation constraint is
binding. Second, the same condition implies that the ratio of marginal utilities remains
constant over time if this is the case. These facts, however, are the deﬁning feature of a
perfect risk sharing allocation. Assume now that we start with λ>2.5, implying that type
1 households hold signiﬁcantly lower initial assets, and they are therefore entitled to less
consumption than agent 2. In this case, Figure 1 implies that λ0 depends on the idiosyncratic
income of the agent, and that it will drop to a new level depending on the shock realization.
In particular, the higher the idiosyncratic income, the lower will be the new level of the
relative wealth, since type 1 agents require a higher compensation for staying in the risk
sharing arrangement. Note that, whenever λ jumps, type 1 agents’ participation constraint
is binding, and these new level of λ0 pins down the borrowing constraint faced by type 1
households in the previous period. This process will go on until the highest income ( 7)
is experienced by the type 1 agents. In this case, λ will enter the stationary distribution7
(λ =1 .195) and remain constant forever, implying that agents enjoy permanent perfect risk
sharing from that period on. In addition, a symmetric argument implies that whenever
λ<0.83, λ will become 0.83and remain constant forever after ﬁnite number of periods.
Given this, the present framework implies that agents will obtain full insurance in the long-
run, independently of the initial wealth distribution. On the other hand, the economy may
experience movements in consumption and the relative wealth in the short run.
The second important observation is that, comparing the two economies, we observe
minor diﬀerences only. First of all, the long-run behavior is practically identical. Both
economies enjoy perfect risk sharing in the long run. In addition, if λ(s0) ∈ [0.8368,1.195],
then the long-run allocations are identical. This is due to the fact that the borrowing con-
straints (and therefore the savings constraint of the intermediary in the constrained eﬃcient
economy) will never bind in this case, implying that individual consumptions will be deter-
mined by λ(s0), and capital accumulation will be (unconstrained) eﬃcient. On the other
hand, if λ(s0) is outside the above interval, the long-run allocations are only slightly diﬀer-
ent, since the bounds of the stationary distribution are slightly diﬀerent in the two models.
As we see, the model with savings constraint allows for a slightly wider range of the wealth
distribution. Also, the model with autarky eﬀects allows for a wider range of λ0 outside the
stationary distribution. As we will see below, this is the consequence of the diﬀerent capital
accumulation pattern in the two economies.
Figure 2, shows the optimal consumption of type 1 households in the two economies as
a function of λ for diﬀerent levels of the labor endowment. Obviously, as the relative wealth
7We use the terms ergodic set and the stationary distribution loosely in this paper. Notice, however that
we deﬁned these sets as the possible values of λ in the long run. In fact, the initial condition λ0 will pin down
a unique long-run value for the relative wealth, that is, for any given initial value, the long run distribution
is degenerate.
20of type 1 households decreases (λ increases) their consumption decreases. Also, since we
have perfect risk sharing in the stationary distribution, consumption does not depend on the
idiosyncratic labour endowment there. For the same reason, the optimal consumption allo-
cations are identical across the two models in this range. Outside the stationary distribution,
as expected, consumption is increasing in the labour endowment. Also, we observe that the
model with autarky eﬀects allows for a higher consumption for every λ and   outside the
stationary distribution. On the one hand, this is not surprising, since these allocations corre-
spond to the constrained eﬃcient allocations, where we should expect a higher consumption.
On the other hand, the resource constraint then implies that, in the model without saving
constraints, aggregate capital accumulation will be higher.
Figure 3 displays the next period’s aggregate capital K0 as a function of λ and   and
it documents the previously mentioned pattern. Not surprisingly, aggregate capital is again
independent of both the wealth distribution and labour endowments in the stationary dis-
tribution, where it is set to its eﬃcient level. On the other hand, markets are eﬀectively
incomplete outside the stationary distribution, where we see a higher capital accumulation.
This result is well-documented in models with exogenously incomplete markets, see Aiyagari
(1994) for a model without aggregate uncertainty and Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2005)
for a model with a similar set-up but trade in physical capital only. Note also that these
eﬀects are the biggest when low idiosyncratic labour endowment coincides with low wealth
(this is the case for type 1 households on the upper right corner of the ﬁgure and for type 2
households in the upper left corner).
To see why this happens, we can look at Figure 1 and at the Euler equation of the
constrained eﬃcient problem in (20). It is clear for Figure 1 that, when type one households
have labour endowment  7 and a high wealth (λ<0.5), the participation constraint of type
2 households is going to be binding in many continuation states ((vi(st+1) > 0). In turn, this
implies that the return of investment is higher and more capital will be accumulated. In the
decentralized problem this is equivalent to an increase of most of the Arrow security prices
q(st+1|st), implying that intermediaries have to pay lower return to the agents and therefore
invest more. In the model without autarky eﬀects, this is the only eﬀect. On the other
hand, this over accumulation is mitigated by the autarky eﬀects in the constrained eﬃcient
allocation. In that case, the planner internalizes that increasing capital will increase the value





) > 0 for some st+1, t h ep r e s e n c eo ft h i s
eﬀect will then imply a lower capital accumulation. In the decentralized solution, this is
internalized with a binding upper limit on capital accumulation, which deters intermediaries
from excessively overinvesting. This is the indirect reason of why a higher range of the
wealth distribution (a higher range of λ) results in the model with saving constraints. As
an example, if type 1 households have a low labour endowment (labor income) and a low
wealth in the model with no autarky eﬀects, they will have less incentives to default because
capital accumulation is lower and the value of their outside option is therefore lower.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the life-time utilities of the agents with diﬀerent labour endow-
ments and initial wealths (measured by λ). Obviously, welfare is identical across the two
economies in the stationary distribution, since the allocations are identical. Outside the
stationary distribution, however, agents gain some utility in the suboptimal allocation com-
pared to the constrained eﬃcient allocation (autarky eﬀects) if they are relatively wealthy
(λ<1) ,a n dt h e yl o o s es o m eu t i l i t yw h e nt h e ya r el e s sw e a l t h y( λ>1). The reason for the
21utility loss is that, although agents can enjoy a higher current consumption in the economy
with saving constraints, there is also less capital accumulation, aﬀecting their life-time utility
negatively. When λ>1.195, this second eﬀect dominates. Notice that these utility gains
and losses are quantitatively very small, even outside the stationary distribution. In other
words, the competitive equilibrium allocation without the savings constraint is close to be
optimal.
Overall, we conclude that both economies have practically identical allocations in the
long run (stationary distribution), and they have some (small) diﬀerences in the short run.
The model without saving constraints leads to a higher short run capital accumulation and
consequently to a lower consumption. We checked the robustness of these ﬁndings by allowing
agents to accumulate physical capital through the intermediaries in autarky, increasing the
value of the outside option and limiting the scope of risk sharing in both economies. In this
case, we obtain a somewhat narrower range of λ in the stationary distribution. However,
none of the other key ﬁndings are inﬂuenced by this change. We still ﬁnd a perfect risk
sharing in the long-run in both models, and we ﬁn dt h es a m et y p eo fq u a l i t a t i v ec h a n g e s
and the same relatively small diﬀerences between the two models.
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we show two key theoretical results. First, in the presence of capital accu-
mulation, the constrained eﬃcient allocation of a model with limited commitment cannot
be decentralized by a competitive equilibrium with borrowing constraints that are not tight,
in contrast to the ﬁnding in endowment economies. On the other hand, this decentraliza-
tion is possible with the introduction of ﬁnancial intermediaries and an upper limit on their
capital holdings. Second, we characterize the competitive equilibrium with only borrowing
constraints that are not too tight. We show that these limits are micro founded, since the
intermediaries have no incentives to loosen or tighten them. Furthermore, we show that the
key ineﬃciency in this economy is coming from the fact that intermediaries do not internalize
the eﬀect of aggregate capital on the autarky value of the agents.
We think that this second result is particularly important, since it provides an empiri-
cally plausible decentralization which can be used to analyze several applied questions where
ﬁnancial intermediation is important. In addition, in spite of the fact that this economy is
suboptimal, the solution for the equilibrium allocation does not require any extra computa-
tional burden as compared to the optimal solution due to our characterization result.
Finally, we show that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the equilibrium alloca-
tions with and without the saving constraint in our framework, especially in the long run.
This is mostly due to the fact, the in our production economy, autarky is not an attractive
enough outside option, even if agents can save after default. One key direction of future
research should be to identify other applications where the diﬀerences are more signiﬁcant.
In particular, models where the long run optimal allocation does not display permanent risk
sharing, such as Kehoe and Perri (2002). They can be studied using this methodology to
further understand the important diﬀerences between the two equilibria.
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23Appendix: Figures
Figure 1: Next Period Wealth Distribution λ0 as a Function of λ and



















































































































































Next Period Wealth Distribution as a Function of the Current Wealth Distribution
















25Figure 2: Optimal Consumption (c1) as a Function of λ and  






































26Figure 3: Aggregate Capital Accumulation (K0) as a Function of λ and  

















































  Next Period Capital Stock as a Function of the Current Wealth Distribution
(K=38.26)      






























































27Figure 4: Life-Time Utilities (W) as a Function of λ and  
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